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We examine the determinants of differences across countries and over time in the distribution 
of personal incomes in the OECD. The Gini coefficient of personal incomes can be expressed 
as a function of the wage differential, the labour share, and the unemployment rate, hence 
labour market institutions are an essential determinant of the distribution of income, although 
the sign of their impact is ambiguous. We use a panel of OECD countries for the period 1970-
96 to examine these effects. We find, first, that the labour share remains an important 
determinant of overall inequality patterns, and, second, that stronger unions and a more 
generous unemployment benefit tend to reduce income inequality. High capital-labour ratios 
also emerge as a strong equalising factor, which has in part offset the impact of increasing 
wage inequality on the US distribution of personal incomes. 
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Over the past two decades a large literature has sought to understand the evolution of wage inequality in 
OECD countries; see, for example, Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997).  Different patterns across countries 
have been documented, and labour market institutions have been shown to play an important role in 
determining the distribution of wages. In this paper we try to understand which are the determinants of 
differences in income inequality across countries and over time in OECD countries. In doing so, we focus 
on two aspects largely neglected by the literature. The first one is the role of factor shares as determinants 
of the personal distribution of income. We argue that wage inequality is only one of the components of 
personal income inequality, and that both the labour share and unemployment play an important role. The 
second aspect consists of understanding the impact of labour market institutions on overall income 
inequality, as opposed to only on relative wages.   
  Contrary to the textbook approach in macroeconomics where factor shares are taken to be 
constant, variations in the labour share across countries and over time are large. Figure 1 illustrates the 
recent experiences of the US, the UK, Germany and France over the period 1960 to 2002. The US has the 
most stable labour share, which fluctuates between 55 and 59 per cent. France and Germany have, for 
most of the period, a lower labour share than the two Anglo-Saxon countries, and exhibit a hump-shaped 
pattern with the labour share increasing up to around 1981 and declining thereafter; while the UK has 
experienced a decline over the period.1 Despite a substantial reduction in the differences between those 
four countries, in 2002 their labour shares ranged from 53% in France to 58% in the US. 
  The first question we address in this paper is whether these differences in the factor distribution 
of income can help us explain variations in the distribution of personal incomes in OECD countries over 
the past thirty years. Indeed, recent work by Piketty (2001, 2003) and Piketty and Saez (2003) has 
emphasised the importance of capital income for the highest income groups even in recent times, and 
Atkinson (2003) has suggested that the increase in inequality that took place in a number of OECD 
countries during the 1980s was in part due to the rise in the return to capital. Our second concern is the 
impact of labour market institutions. The effect of institutions on relative wages has been well 
documented. For example, stronger unions tend to compress the wage distribution, which in turn would 
tend to reduce income inequality. However, these institutions also affect the unemployment rate and, 
potentially, the labour share, and hence will affect the distribution of income through channels other than 
wages.  
                                                           
1 The notable exception is the sharp increase and subsequent fall of the labour share during the labour government 
of 1974-1976, after a period of major conflict between unions and the conservative government of Heath.  
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  We start by presenting the theoretical framework. First, we consider how labour market outcomes 
–that is, the relative wage, the labour share and the unemployment rate- are determined in an economy 
with non-competitive labour markets. Crucially for our purposes, we suppose the aggregate production 
function is CES, implying that the labour share is not constant but rather depends on factor inputs. Since 
labour markets are not competitive, labour market institutions, by affecting employment levels, become an 
essential determinant of the labour share. We capture this idea with a model with two types of workers. 
Skilled workers are subject to efficiency wage considerations, which imply no market clearing. For the 
unskilled the wage and employment determination process is the outcome of wage bargaining between a 
union that represents unskilled workers and a firm in a right-to-manage framework. We find that the 
equilibrium employment levels are a function of union bargaining power, the unemployment benefit, and 
the capital-labour ratio. The bargained levels of employment and wages will in turn determine the overall 
labour share, wage ratio, and unemployment rate, making them a function of labour market institutions.   
  The second step is to decompose the Gini coefficient of the distribution of personal incomes in 
a model economy. Our highly stylised set up considers four types of agents. The first are the jobless who 
receive the unemployment benefit. The second are unskilled workers who receive the unskilled wage. 
Lastly, there are skilled workers, which may own capital or not. Those who do not will simply receive the 
skilled wage, while those who do (the worker-capitalists) receive both the skilled wage and profits. There  
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are then three sources of inequality: employment versus unemployment, skilled versus unskilled wages, 
and the distribution of capital. In fact, the Gini index for personal incomes can be expressed as a function 
of the labour share, the relative wage, the unemployment benefit, and the proportion of the population in 
each category. A smaller labour share, a higher relative wage, and a lower unemployment benefit, all 
increase income inequality.  This decomposition implies that the effect of labour market institutions on 
inequality is ambiguous. For example, both higher union power and unemployment benefits increase the 
unemployment rate, which tends to raise the Gini coefficient, but reduce the relative wage and increase 
the labour share, both of which tend to lower inequality. 
We test these propositions in a panel of OECD countries for the period 1970-96. We find that 
the labour share remains a fundamental aspect of overall inequality patterns, with an effect roughly as 
important as that of relative wages. Our results also show that that stronger unions and a more generous 
unemployment benefit tend to reduce income inequality. The effect of labour market institutions tends to 
be large, and explains a substantial fraction of the variation across countries. The other variable that 
emerges from our analysis as having a large impact is the capital-labour ratio. High capital-labour ratios 
tend to increase the labour share, and hence reduce income inequality. In fact, this appears to have been a 
major force dampening the increase of income inequality in the US over the last few decades. 
The paper adds to the recent revival of interest in the factors shaping the distributions income 
across countries (Bourguignon and Morrisson, 1990, 1998; Li, Squire, and Zou, 1998; Barro, 2000; 
Alderson and Nielsen, 2002; Breen and García Peñalosa, 2004). For decades empirical work on cross-
country differences in the distribution of income consisted of tests of the Kuznets hypothesis taking the 
form of regressions of inequality on the level of GDP and its square. Only recently have variables other 
than the level of income been considered, such as the level of human capital, the degree of 
democratisation, or the extent of financial development. Although this approach is helpful in 
understanding the underlying causes of inequality, it leaves little room for policy recommendations as in 
most cases the particular mechanism through which these variables impact inequality is not understood. 
By focussing on the basic determinants of the distribution of income we want to understand whether 
labour market institutions play a role because they affect the unemployment rate, the distribution of 
wages, or the way in which capital and labour are rewarded.  
  The paper is also related to the literature on the evolution of inequality in industrial economies 
over the past three decades. Two features have dominated this literature. One has been the increase in 
income inequality in a number of countries; the other the sharp rise in the relative wages in the UK and 
the US (Atkinson, 1997, 2003; Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997; Bound and Johnson, 1992; Juhn, Murphy, 
and Brooks, 1993). Our paper emphasises two aspects. First, that although wage inequality is a crucial 
aspect of the income distribution, the distribution of wealth still plays a substantial role as captured by the 
negative impact of the labour share in our regressions for the Gini coefficient. Second, our analysis 
highlights the differences between an increase in the relative wage and in wage inequality. Understanding 
the evolution of inequality requires knowing the proportions of agents receiving each salary and not only 
the relative salaries, and looking at the labour share is a (crude) way of capturing both.   
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  A number of recent papers have been concerned with the labour share. The focus of these works 
has been to understand the determinants of either the evolution of the labour share over time in OECD, 
or cross-country differences (Blanchard, Nordhaus, and Phelps, 1997; Rodrik, 1999; de Serres, Scarpetta 
and de la Maisonneuve, 2002; Bentolila and Saint-Paul, 2003). We present a different perspective, trying to 
understand not the determinants but the effects of differences in the rewards to capital and labour across 
countries and over time.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents our theoretical model. Section 3 presents the 
data and our results. We then perform a number of simulation exercises. Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Theoretical considerations 
2.1. The determinants of the relative wage and the labour share 
2.1.1. Technological determinants 
We consider an economy with three inputs, capital, denoted by K , skilled workers, H , and unskilled 
workers,  L . Output is produced according to a constant return to scale production function 
) , , ( H L K F Y = .  As is well known, a Cobb-Douglas production function implies constant labour and 
capital shares. In order to explain observed variations in labour shares, a more general production 
function is needed. We assume that output is produced with a CES production function using capital, K, 
and a “labour aggregate”. Production is a CES function of K  and the labour aggregate, which is in turn a 
Cobb-Douglas function of skilled and unskilled labour. That is, output is produced according to2  
  () []
σ − σ − β − β σ − α − + α =
/ 1
1 ) 1 ( L H K Y    with  ∞ < σ ≤ −1 ,  1 0 , 1 0 < β < < α <    (1) 
This production function allows for different degrees of substitutability across factors. The elasticity of 
substitution between skilled and unskilled labour is 1, while that between capital and the labour aggregate 
is  ) 1 /( 1 σ + . For  0 = σ  the production function would be Cobb-Douglas in the three inputs. In line 
with existing evidence,3 we assume that the elasticity of substitution between capital and the labour 
aggregate is less than one, which requires  0 > σ .  
Differentiating the production function we obtain factor demand functions,  
()
σ σ + − σ − α − + α α =
/ ) 1 (





σ σ σ + − σ α − + α α − β − =
/ ) 1 (





σ σ σ + − σ α − + α α − β =
/ ) 1 (
) 1 ( ) 1 (       ( 2 c )  
                                                           
2 This formulation has been proposed, for example, by Katz and Murphy (1992). 
3 This is consistent with the evidence reported in Hamermesh (1993), Rowthorn (1999), Krusell, Ohanian, Rios-Rull, 
and Violante (2000), and Antras (2004).  
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where r is the interest rate,  s w  and  u w  are respectively the (gross) skilled and unskilled wages, and 
β − β ≡
1 / L H K x .  
The labour share, denoted θ, is defined  as the ratio of total employee compensation to value 
added.  With two types of workers this is simply 
Y
L w H w u s +
≡ θ          ( 3 )  
Defining the relative wage as  u s w w / ≡ ω , and using equations (2) we obtain the inverse relative demand 
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where  ) /( L H K k + =  is the capital-labour ratio and  L H h / =  the relative skilled employment. The 
labour share and the relative demand for labour hence depend on the capital-labour ratio and the relative 





































A higher relative employment ratio reduces the relative wage, while the impact of the capital-labour ratio 
and relative employment on the labour share depends on the elasticity of substitution. For  0 = σ , the 
labour share is simply  α − = θ 1 , and neither k nor h  will affect it. Our assumption of  0 > σ  and 
supposing, reasonably, that  1 > ω , we have  0 / > ∂ ∂ k θ  and  0 / < ∂ θ ∂ h . That is, a higher capital-labour 
ratio will increase the labour share, while greater relative skilled employment will reduce both the labour 
share and the relative wage.4 
 
2.1.2. Institutional determinants 
If labour markets were competitive, (4) and (5) would imply that a country’s capital-labour ratio and its 
relative supply of skills would be the sole determinants of the labour share and the relative wage. 
However, labour markets are not competitive. Employment levels hence differ from factor supplies, and 
anything that affects employment would in turn affect θ and ω. In order to understand which are the 
                                                           
4 The case where  0 < σ  is discussed in Appendix I.  
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potential determinants of these variables we examine wage and employment determination with two types 
of labour.  
  We assume that wages for the two types of workers are determined in different ways. For skilled 
workers, we suppose that imperfect information on the part of the firm about whether or not employees 
are shirking forces the former to pay wages above the market clearing level, which in turn lead to 
unemployment, as in the efficiency wage model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1985). For unskilled workers, we 
model the wage and employment determination process as the outcome of wage bargaining between a 
single union and a single firm in a right-to-manage framework. The union bargains over unskilled wages 
with the firm, and then the latter sets employment. 5  
 
Efficiency wages for skilled workers 
Consider a simple, one-period efficiency wage model. Suppose skilled agents receive a net wage 
s s w w ) 1 ( ~ τ − = , where τ is the tax wedge paid to the government as employer and employee 
contributions. Workers are assumed to be risk-averse with utility  
ρ = i i w w U ) ( ,  with  1 0 ≤ ρ < .  Then, 
the utility of shirking is simply  ( )
ρ ρ + τ − − = pB w p U s
S ) 1 ( ) 1 (  and that of not-shirking 
ρ − τ − = ) ) 1 (( e w U s
N , where  p  is the probability of being caught if shirking, B is the unemployment 
benefit (or the monetary equivalent of leisure if the latter is unavailable), and e is the monetary cost of 
effort.6 The resulting efficiency wage,  s w , is given by the solution to 
( )
ρ ρ ρ + τ − − = − τ − pB w p e w s s ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ) 1 ((       ( 6 )    
Simple differentiation shows that  s w  is increasing in B  and e, and decreasing in  p . Given  s w  and the 
level of unskilled employment, the inverse demand for skilled labour, equation (2c), determines skilled 
employment, H .   
 
Union bargaining and the unskilled wage 
Consider now the determination of the unskilled wage and employment level. We assume that the union 
represents only the unskilled, and that it has a utilitarian utility function of the form  
() () [ ] ) ( ~ 1
B U L L w LU
L
V u − + =        ( 7 )  
where  L  is the unskilled labour force,   (.) U  is the workers’ utility function, 
ρ = i i w w U ~ ) ~ ( , and the net 
wage is given by  u u w w ) 1 ( ~ τ − = . The bargaining process is then governed by 
                                                           
5 All our results can be obtained if instead of having efficiency wages for the skilled we had a single union that 
represented both types of workers and bargained simultaneously over both wages. 
6 It would be straightforward to allow for the dynamic flows into and out of employment. For simplicity, we assume 
here that labour markets are separated by skills, such that an unemployed skilled worker cannot work as unskilled. 
Note that  B  goes untaxed, as in most institutional set-ups.  
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[ ] () ()
γ γ ρ ρ τ
− − − − −
1 ) ) 1 (( max H w L w Y B w L s u u wu
     (8) 
The bargaining solution is obtained by maximising this expression with respect to  u w , taking into account 
the fact that, for a given skilled wage, changing the unskilled wage affects both skilled and unskilled 






































) 1 (     (9) 
where  L ε  is the elasticity of the demand for unskilled labour. Since  L ε ,  u w , and θ are functions of  H  
and L, equation (9) determines  u w as a function of skilled and unskilled employment.  
 
Equilibrium and comparative statics  
The equilibrium of the model is then given by equations (2b),  (2c), (6), and (9), that is, by  










































σ σ σ + − σ α − + α α − β − =
/ ) 1 (





σ σ σ + − σ α − + α α − β =
/ ) 1 (
) 1 ( ) 1 (        ( 1 1 )  
() τ ϕ , , , p e B ws =           ( 1 2 )  
where  ) , , ( p e B ϕ  is implicitly defined by (6). Together these four equations determine the equilibrium 
levels of skilled and unskilled employment, H  and L , and the two wages as a function of model 
parameters: the unemployment benefit, B , the bargaining power of the union, γ, the capital stock, K , as 
well as the preference parameters, ρ and e, and the technological parameters,  σ β α , , , and  p . 
Let  ) /( ) ( 1 H L H L u + + − ≡  be the unemployment rate, where H  is the skilled labour force. 
Once  H  and L  are determined, we can obtain our three main variables of interest, the labour share, the 
relative wage, and the unemployment rate, which we can express as functions of the stock of capital and 
labour market institutions (as well as of the preference and technology parameters): 
() γ θ = θ , ,B K ,           ( 1 3 )  
() γ ω = ω , ,B K ,          ( 1 4 )  
() γ = , ,B K u u .             ( 1 5 )  
All comparative statics are derived in Appendix I. Consider first the effect of union power. It is possible 
to show that  
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As in the standard wage bargaining model, the direct effect of greater union bargaining power is to 
reduce unskilled employment. This reduces the marginal product of skilled labour, and skilled 
employment falls in order to maintain the skilled wage at  s w . Since both types of employment are 
reduced, the unemployment rate increases. Furthermore, under the assumption that  0 > σ , the labour 
share also increases, the reason being that lower levels of employment result in a higher capital-labour 
ratio. The effect of an increase in γ on unskilled employment can be shown to be stronger than that on 
H , implying an increase in relative skilled employment, and hence a reduction in the relative wage.  
  Concerning an increase in the stock of capital, we have  








A higher capital stock raises the marginal product of labour (both unskilled and skilled), leading to 
greater employment of both types of workers for a given wage. In the case of unskilled workers, unions 
react by demanding higher wages, which results in an increase in  u w . In case of skilled workers, given a 
constant efficiency wage, the increase in the capital stock leads to an expansion of skilled employment so 
as to maintain the marginal product of labour constant. Moreover, the indirect effects on L through the 
change in H  and vice versa reinforce these direct impacts. Under reasonable conditions (see appendix), 
we can also show that  











A greater capital stock has a direct positive effect on θ, as a higher K  increases the marginal product of 
labour, and indirect negative impacts through the increase in both types of employment. The positive 
effect dominates, implying that a greater stock of capital increases the labour share. The effect on skilled 
employment can also be shown to be greater than that on unskilled employment, resulting in a higher h 
and hence a lower relative wage. 
  A higher unemployment benefit has two effects. On the one hand, it increases the outside option 
for unskilled workers, hence unions will bargain for a higher wage and accept a lower level of 
employment. On the other, it increases the efficiency wages that the firm must pay to skilled workers, 
which requires the firm to employ fewer skilled workers in order to increase their marginal product. The 
reduction in H  tends to reduce the marginal product of the unskilled and hence partially offsets the 
reduction in L. If the direct effect dominates, so that  0 / < dB dL , it is then possible to show that 










That is, a higher unemployment benefit reduces both skilled and unskilled employment, increasing the rate 
of unemployment and raising the labour share. The effect on the relative wage is ambiguous, as both the 




2.2. The  Gini coefficient in a model economy 
Having established that labour market institutions affect labour shares, the relative wage, and the 
unemployment rate, we turn to their impact on the distribution of personal incomes. Our empirical 
measure of income inequality will be the Gini coefficient. We hence decompose this measure of inequality 
into its various components for a model economy with four types of agents.  
The labour force (or population) is normalised to one, that is,  1 = + H L .  Following our set-up 
in the previous section, workers can be either employed and receive the skilled or unskilled wage, 
s s w w ) 1 ( ~ τ − =  and  u u w w ) 1 ( ~ τ − = , or unemployed, in which case they receive the unemployment 
benefit  B .7 Some individuals also own capital and receive profits. We assume that the owners of capital 
are always skilled workers, and that they are never unemployed. Furthermore, we assume that the revenue 
raised from employer/employee contributions, τ, is  used to finance the unemployment benefit, so that 
u y B / τθ = .8  This implies that the payment of net wages, capital income, and unemployment benefit 
exhaust output, and average income is equal to output per capita, y . 
We then have four types of agents characterised as follows:  
(i)  A fraction u  of the labour force are unemployed, and receive the unemployment benefit B ; 
(ii)  A fraction l of the labour force are unskilled workers earning a net wage  u w ~ ; 
(iii)  A fraction s  of the labour force are skilled workers. Of those  κ − s  own no capital and have an 
income equal to the net skilled wage  s w ~ ; 
(iv)  There are κ  worker-capitalists, each of whom earns profits π as well as the wage  s w ~ . 
Our assumptions imply that  1 = + + u l s . We further suppose that  B w w u s > > ~ ~ ,  while the profits of 
each worker-capitalist depend on the capital share,   κ θ − = π / ) 1 ( y .   
The degree of income inequality is measured by the Gini concentration index computed across 
subgroups of population. With N  subgroups, the definition of the Gini concentration index is: 





j i n n y y
y
Gini ⋅ ⋅ − = ∑∑
== 11 2
1
        ( 1 6 )  
where  i y  is the income in subgroup i, which has relative weight  i n , and  y  is the average income.  
Given our assumptions about the population and their incomes, the Gini coefficient can be expressed as 
                                                           
7  B  can also be interpreted as a subsistence wage earned in the informal sector, if an unemployment benefit does 
not exists.  
8 We are implicitly assuming that profits go untaxed. The implication of this assumption is that the tax rate does not 
affect the Gini index directly. The alternative assumption (taxing capital income) will make τ appear in the Gini 
index reported in equation  (17). In our dataset, the tax wedge is highly collinear with the unemployment benefit and 

















) 1 )( 1 (       ( 1 7 )  
where  w ~  is the average net wage. The Gini coefficient is thus a function of population proportions 
() s l u , , , the number of capital owners κ , the capital share, the wage differential, and the unemployment 
subsidy. A higher capital share will increase inequality by raising profits and thus the income of the richest 
individuals. A greater wage differential between the skilled and the unskilled will raise the Gini coefficient 
as it increases inequality between groups of employed individuals, while a larger unemployment benefit 
will reduce the Gini coefficient. The effect of the unemployment rate is ambiguous. This is a standard 
effect when there is inequality within and between groups. The unemployed have a low income but are all 
equal, while the employed have a higher income but there is inequality within this group. More 
unemployment, by increasing the number of individuals in the less unequal category, may increase or 
reduce overall inequality. The equalising effect will, however, only dominate for unemployment rates over 
50%, hence we expect higher unemployment to increase income inequality.   
  Our framework of analysis makes a number of simplifications, which are worth mentioning. First, 
both the distributions of wealth and of wages have been compressed, since we only have two types of 
workers (skilled/unskilled) and one type of wealth-owner. Second, two sources of income are missing. 
One are the rents on assets such as land or intellectual property rights and patents, which we ignore as 
they are a very minor fraction of the total. The other is pensions. Note, however, that pensions can come 
from three sources: they can be provided by pension funds, in which case they are capital income; they 
can be private pensions paid by a company to its former employees, in which case they are (most often) 
counted as labour payments in the company’s balance sheet; and they can be public pensions. It is only the 
third component that we have not included. This could in principle be an important source of income 
differences;9 however the data are rarely available. Third, we do not distinguish between personal income 
distribution and household income distribution.10 Lastly, note that we have focussed on gross income 
inequality, with the only tax we have considered being the unemployment insurance contribution. We also 
model the tax rate in a naïve way, considering immediate readjustments after a change in unemployment, 
thanks to the balanced budget constraint; available alternatives not considered here are the lowering of the 
replacement rate and or a reduction in coverage (see Atkinson and Brandolini 2003). 
        
3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1. Empirical specification  
We saw in equation (17) that the Gini coefficient of personal incomes could be expressed as a function of 
the labour share, the wage premium to skill, the replacement rate, and population shares. The model 
                                                           
9 Indeed Bourguignon et al. (2002) show that a major source of differences in distribution between the US and 
Mexico is the level of public pensions in those two countries.  
10 Kenworthy (2003) and Esping-Andersen (2004) claim that most of the rising trend in household income inequality 
is attributable to changing patterns of income distribution within the family, associated with increased labour market 
participation of women and young people, a question beyond the scope of this paper.  
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identifies the determinants of employment and wages for both skilled and unskilled workers, and through 
them of the wage differential, the labour share, and the unemployment rate. We start by estimating these 
relationships. Denoting  by it θ  the labour share, by  it ω  the relative wage, and by  it u  the 
unemployment rate for country i  in year t, our strategy will consist of estimating the following 
relationships 
 
it t i it it it it it a a b a a a ε + λ + δ + µ ⋅ + γ ⋅ + ⋅ + χ ⋅ + = θ
+ + +
4 3 2 1 0      ( 1 8 )  
it t i it it it it it c c b c c c ε + λ + δ + µ ⋅ + γ ⋅ + ⋅ + χ ⋅ + = ω
− ± −
4 3 2 1 0      ( 1 9 )  
it t i it it it it it d d b d d d u ε + λ + δ + µ ⋅ + γ ⋅ + ⋅ + χ ⋅ + =
+ + −
4 3 2 1 0      ( 2 0 )  

















b ~ =  is the unemployment 
benefit replacement rate;  it γ  captures wage-push factors, and will be proxied by union membership rates 
in the labour force and by the so-called Kaitz index ( the ratio between the minimum wage and the 
median wage); and  it µ  captures additional country specific factors, such as the oil price, educational 
attainment, and the tax wedge, that have been included in previous analyses of either of these three 
variables. The signs reported below the coefficients to be estimated indicate our theoretical expectations. 
  When we move to our variable of interest, the personal distribution of income, we cannot 
proceed by direct estimation of equation (17). Our expression for the Gini coefficient, although an 
identity, captures the main components of the distribution of income. Given the distribution of agents in 
the economy, inequality depends on three factors, namely, the way in which total output is divided 
between profits and wages, the distribution of wages within the labour force, and welfare provision as 
captured by the unemployment benefit. If we had information on all the right-hand-side variables we 
could simply decompose the Gini coefficient into its various components, and examine how much wage 
inequality or the distribution of wealth contribute to overall income inequality.  However, some of the 
data required, such as the distribution of wealth or the number of employed individuals at each level of 
education, are not available. Therefore we consider the estimation of the following relationship 
it it t i it it it it it def b g u g g g g Gini ε λ δ ω θ + + + + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + =
− + + −
4 3 2 1 0  (21) 
where the signs underlying the coefficient are in accordance with equation (17). We also control for 
different definitions used to compute the Gini index (concerning the nature of the recipient unit and the 
type of income taken into account) with the variable  it def .  
The coefficient  1 g  captures the relative contribution of the factor distribution of income to 
personal income inequality, while  2 g  measures the contribution of the wage differential to overall  
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inequality. In the highly simplified framework with workers and capitalists,  1 g  could be interpreted as a 
measure of the between-group inequality, where groups are to be defined in accordance to their position 
in the production process, while the coefficients  2 g , 3 g , and  4 g  can be interpreted as the contribution of 
inequality within the group of workers.  
  Equation (21) cannot be directly estimated, since some variables are potentially endogenous and 
could be correlated with unobservable and/or unmeasured variables (such as the degree of risk-aversion 
or the level of skilled and unskilled employment) that may also affect personal income inequality through 
other channels. In order two obtain an unbiased estimate of the impact of the functional distribution of 
income onto the personal distribution (coefficient  1 g ), as well as assessing the contribution of earnings 
inequality (coefficients  2 g  and  3 g ), we will follow two strategies. One consists in estimating the 
simultaneous equation system given by equations (18), (19), (20) and (21), through three-stage least 
squares methods. The alternative is to instrument the potentially endogenous variables. Using the 
estimates obtained from equations (18), (19) and (20), we can then estimate equation (21) as 
 
() () ( ) it it t i it it it it it it it it it it it def b g b u g b g b g g Gini ε + + λ + δ + ⋅ + γ χ ⋅ + γ χ ω ⋅ + γ χ θ ⋅ + =
− + + −
4 3 2 1 0 , , ˆ , , ˆ , , ˆ   (22) 
  Since we are also interested in assessing the overall impact of labour market institutions on 
income inequality, we will estimate as well the reduced form equation obtained when we replace (18)-(20) 
into equation (21), which yields 
it it t i it it it it def h b h h h Gini ε + + λ + δ + γ ⋅ + ⋅ + χ ⋅ + =
± ± ±
3 2 1 0      ( 2 3 )  
The reduced form equation shows that the overall effect of labour market institutions is ambiguous. 
Stronger unions tend to increase the labour share and compress the wage distribution, both of which 
reduce inequality. However, they also increase the unemployment rate, which raises the Gini coefficient. 
An increase in the unemployment benefit raises both the labour share and unemployment, and these 
changes have opposite effects on inequality. Lastly, a higher capital-labour ratio unambiguously reduces 
inequality as it simultaneously increases the labour share and lowers both the unemployment rate and the 
relative wage.  
 
3.2. The data 
Our data cover 16 OECD countries over the period 1960-96. Details on the data and their sources are 
provided in Appendix II. As is well known, the data on income inequality are problematic and 
international comparisons difficult (see Atkinson and Brandolini, 2001). For this reason we use two 
different sources for our income inequality measure: one measure is obtained from Brandolini (2003), who 
collected comparable measures of income inequality for several OECD countries; the other measure is 
obtained from Deininger and Squire (1996), which has become the standard dataset for empirical studies 
of income inequality. Brandolini (2003) provides detailed information on the way in which data were  
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collected, allowing us to build a series that is more comparable over time, and most of our analysis will be 
based on them. However, as a robustness check, we replicate our regression equations using the Deininger 
and Squire data. Unfortunately these two datasets on income inequality overlap only partially, and 
therefore the results are not directly comparable.  
 
Table 1a – Descriptive statistics for main variables – sample means by countries 
 
country gini1  gini2  p9010  ls1  ur  ben 
Australia  32.83  38.08  2.83 0.49 5.32 0.22 
Belgium  27.75  26.81  2.34 0.52 6.64 0.41 
Canada  36.03  31.32  4.24 0.53 7.42 0.26 
Denmark  32.86  32.08  2.17 0.55 5.01 0.44 
Finland  21.76  29.77  2.45 0.51 5.68 0.25 
France  38.33  42.13  3.44 0.52 6.52 0.30 
Germany  36.22  31.23  2.84 0.54 3.85 0.29 
Italy  34.71  34.67  2.33 0.46 6.07 0.05 
Japan  na 34.86  3.06 0.51 2.20 0.11 
Korea na  34.18  3.97  0.41  na  na 
Netherlands  28.55  28.54  2.61 0.55 5.11 0.45 
New  Zealand 27.23  34.06  3.03 0.48 2.91 0.31 
Norway  22.64  34.75  2.08 0.48 2.73 0.23 
Sweden  47.12  31.69  2.10 0.58 3.17 0.19 
United  kingdom  27.52  25.98  3.27 0.58 6.31 0.22 
United  states  37.58  35.49  4.16 0.58 5.86 0.12 
Total  33.98  32.56  3.03 0.52 5.00 0.26 
 
 
Table 1b – Descriptive statistics for variables in the dataset – sample means  
 
Variable Obs Mean  Std.Dev. Min  Max 
gini1  236  33.981 7.295 19.900  54.300 
p9010  315  3.028 0.690 1.953 4.640 
ls1  651  52.060 5.419 32.268  64.909 
ur  593  4.999 3.324 0.000  16.800 
ben  600  0.257 0.142 0.003 0.670 
udnet  585  0.427 0.181 0.099 0.911 
minim  704  0.667 0.275 0.241 1.000 
edu  656  9.603 1.799 3.457  12.876 
kpw  528  10.187 0.512  7.646 11.173 
tw  566  0.492 0.125 0.237 0.831 
oil 689  4.436  2.498  -0.333  10.991 
Legend: 
gini1  = Gini index on personal income distribution, from Brandolini 2003 
p9010  = ratio between 90th and 10th percentile in earnings distribution, from OECD 
ls1  = labour share on value added at market price, from OECD-Stan database 
ur  = unemployment rate, from Nickell-Nunziata 2001 
ben  = unemployment benefit, from OECD 2001 
udnet  = union density, from Nickell-Nunziata 2001 
minim  = ratio of minimum wage to median wage, from OECD 
edu  = average years of schooling of population 25 and over, whether studying or not, from Cohen and Soto 2001 
kpw  = (log of) capital per worker, from Summer and Heston 1991, updated with mark 5.6 of the Penn tables 
tw  = tax wedge, from Nickell-Nunziata 2001 




Data on labour shares are from the OECD Stan Database. We use the standard definition of total 
compensation per employee over value added, without any correction for the incomes of the self-
employed. This measure fits well our theoretical definition of the labour share, which comprises only the 
income of employed individuals. The wage differential is proxied by the ratio between 1st and the 9th decile 
of the earnings distributions (from OECD specific database).11 Standard datasets were used to obtain 
information about on labour market institutions, educational attainments, and capital (see Appendix II for 
details).  
Table 1a reports some descriptive statistics for the main variables in our regressions. While the 
potential sample size is 592 observations (16 countries × 37 years), many observations are missing, thus 
reducing the available sample to 233 observations, among which the US, the UK, Germany, Sweden, Italy, 
and Canada have the most observations. Table 1b reports the descriptive statistics of our entire dataset.  
 
3.3. Determinants of labour market outcomes 
Table 2 examines the determinants of the labour share and presents three alternative specifications. The 
strongest impact on the labour share is exerted by the capital/labour ratio (as implied by our model), 
independently from the specification adopted. In column 1 we find that the labour share is increasing in 
union density rates. This effect persists when country fixed effects are taken into account (column 2) but 
disappears when cyclical factors are properly accounted for using year fixed effects (column 3). The results 
also capture the fact that when minimum wage legislation applies, employment of both skilled and 
unskilled workers declines, leading to an increase in the wage share.12 Similarly, the unemployment 
benefit also has a positive (but weakly significant) impact on the labour share. We include the price of oil 
in national currency in order to capture exogenous shocks to raw materials prices (this variables also 
captures the effect of competitive devaluations, and the J-effect on internal inflation).13 Lastly, we have 
considered the potential role of the supply of skills. Time series of labour force composition by skills are 
not available over a long enough time span, therefore we use proxies derived from measures of 
educational attainment. The one reported in the text is the average years of education in the adult 
population, but enrolment rates had a similar effect. Once country fixed effects are included, the 
education variable displays a negative coefficient, suggesting that as the number of skilled individuals 
increases, the unemployment rate of the skilled rises, reducing the incentives to shirk and hence allowing 
firms to pay a lower skilled wage.  
                                                           
11 We experimented with both the relative difference and the more conventional measure based on percentile ratio, 
using the latter alternative for better econometric performance. 
12 Using the level of the minimum wage as an explanatory variable is problematic, it is missing for several countries 
(Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden and UK for most of the sample period). In order not to loose 
degrees of freedom, we have replaced the missing observation with a unitary value, which is cleared away with the 
country fixed effect. 
13 Unfortunately this variable alternates sign depending on whether or not time fixed effects are included. For this 




Table 2 – Determinants of labour share – OLS regressions  
robust standard errors - t-statistics in parentheses - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% 
 
  1 2 3 
log capital per worker  -0.036  10.98  8.56 
 [0.04]  [16.19]*** [12.49]*** 
unemployment  benefit  1.236 1.583 3.094 
 [1.03]  [0.72]  [1.73]* 
union density rates  5.529  11.714  -1.054 
 [4.59]***  [5.94]***  [0.65] 
ratio minimum/median wage  -2.37  9.298  3.768 
 [2.99]***  [3.28]***  [1.42] 
log oil price in national currency -0.425  0.957  -0.91 
  [3.94]*** [7.30]*** [3.63]*** 
average years of education  0.537  -4.143  -1.221 
 [3.03]***  [13.35]*** [1.78]* 
Constant  yes yes yes 
Country fixed effects    yes  yes 
Year fixed effects      yes 
Observations  455 455 455 
R²  0.19 0.80 0.88 
 
 
    
Our results are in line with those obtained in earlier work. Bentolila and Saint Paul (2003), who 
consider sectoral data for 12 countries over a shorter time span, find a significant correlation between the 
labour share (corrected for self-employment) and the capital-output ratio, strike activity, employment 
adjustment costs (proxied by previous changes in employment) and total factor productivity, whereas the 
oil price is found to be statistically insignificant. While the sign of the coefficient on the capital-output 
ratio varies across sectors (depending on the degree of substitutability/complementarity between factors), 
they find a weakly significant negative coefficient on strike activity, which they interpret as lagged 
responses to wage push. Blanchard (1997) finds that labour share movements are mainly affected by 
supply shocks, with significant reaction lags. Our results hence support the traditional view that factor 
shares respond to relative factor endowments (here proxied by capital per worker) but that there is 
evidence that wage push factors (union density, minimum wage and unemployment benefit) also have 
some impact. 
  In table 3 we report the determinants of the wage differential. The most significant correlations 
are found with factor endowments: an increase in the capital-labour ratio reduces the wage ratio because 
unskilled workers exploit relatively better the improved employment situation; while an increase in skill 
availability in the labour force (proxied by our human capital variable) tends to depress the relative wage. 
Once again we find a significant impact of labour market institutions. Not surprisingly, the minimum wage 
reduces wage differentials. The unemployment benefit, which according to the model has an ambiguous 
effect as it increases both skilled and unskilled wages, also seems to reduce wage dispersion. Some  
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negative impact can also be found for union density, although this may capture some cyclical component 
as the effect disappear once year fixed effects are included. The time trend exhibits a positive and 
significant coefficient, capturing the upwards trend in earnings inequality, potentially associated to skill-
biased technical change. 
 
Table 3 – Determinants of p90/p10 decile ratio – OLS regressions  
robust standard errors - t-statistics in parentheses - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% 
 
 
  1 2 3 
log capital per worker  -0.137  -0.58  -0.369 
 [0.94]  [4.73]***  [4.11]*** 
unemployment benefit  -0.683 -0.726 -0.765 
 [3.19]***  [2.50]**  [2.36]** 
union  density  rates  -1.385 -0.419 -0.147 
 [9.92]***  [1.49]  [0.48] 
ratio minimum/median wage  -0.853  -2.405  -1.815 
  [5.18]*** [4.65]*** [4.02]*** 
average years of education  0.11  -0.493  -0.508 
  [6.39]*** [5.73]*** [4.08]*** 
time trend  -0.01  0.066  0.053 
 [2.02]**  [6.37]***  [4.81]*** 
Constant  yes yes yes 
Country fixed effects    yes  yes 
Year fixed effects      yes 
Observations  260 260 260 
R²  0.65 0.97 0.98 
 
Koeninger et alt. (2005) study wage inequality in a framework similar to ours, estimating the 
determinants of the p90/p10 ratio for 11 countries over a similar time interval. Our results are consistent 
with their analysis, since both papers find that stronger labour market institutions compress wage 
differentials.14 In contrast to us, Koeninger at al. (2005) include as regressors import penetration and 
R&D intensity to account for skill-biased technological change without finding robust effects.15 We limit 
ourselves to a linear time trend, which is identical across countries and bears a positive coefficient. 
  Lastly, table 4 replicates well-known results on the institutional determinants of unemployment, 
which is positively correlated with union density and the minimum wage. Unemployment declines with 
capital accumulation, as it increases workers’ productivity and hence expands labour demand. Contrary to 
our theoretical expectation, the coefficient on the unemployment benefit is not significant in this equation, 
                                                           
14 This is also consistent with micro-data analysis; see DiNardo et al. (1996) and more recently Card et al. (2003). 
15 A further difference with their analysis is that they consider employment protection. While in their theoretical 
model they assume that skilled and unskilled workers should face different firing cost, due to the lack of data in the 
empirical analysis they resort to the unique series available, produced by OECD. However this series exhibit little 
variation across years, as witnessed by its statistical insignificance when first differences are considered. For this 
reason we have decided not to include EPL into our regressions.  
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while the tax wedge has a negative impact.16 Note that both coefficients are coherent with theoretical 
expectations and are significant when we do not include country dummies, as found in previous work (see 
for example Nickell, 1997). More recently, Nickell et al. (2005) have studied the determinants of the 
unemployment rate for 20 countries over the period 1961-92, including a list of shocks (labour demand, 
total factor productivity, real import, money supply, and real interest rates) and the lagged dependent 
variable. They find a positive and significant coefficient on the unemployment benefit (especially the 
replacement rate) and the rate of change of union density, a weaker effect for the tax wedge, and an 
absence of statistical significance for the employment protection measure.  
 
Table 4 – Determinants of unemployment rate – OLS regressions  
robust standard errors - t-statistics in parentheses - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% 
 
  1 2 3 
log capital per worker  -0.976  -2.333  -2.097 
 [2.28]**  [4.80]***  [3.32]*** 
unemployment benefit 4.438  -1.212  -0.078 
 [5.22]***  [0.73]  [0.05] 
union density rates  -1.383  7.912  4.581 
 [1.58]  [3.96]***  [1.98]** 
ratio minimum/median wage  -1.718  13.484  14.281 
 [2.58]**  [4.49]***  [6.05]*** 
tax wedge  4.634  -7.701  -10.215 
  [3.11]*** [2.95]*** [4.01]*** 
time trend  0.21  0.337  0.247 
 [11.30]*** [13.35]*** [4.38]*** 
Constant  yes yes yes 
Country fixed effects    yes  yes 
Year fixed effects      yes 
Observations  448 448 448 
R²  0.45 0.71 0.78 
 
 
  To sum up, our results are consistent with previous work and indicate that labour market 
institutions are essential determinants of labour market outcomes. Union bargaining power (proxied by 
union density and the minimum wage) has an impact on the labour share, wage differentials and 
unemployment rates, while the unemployment benefit mainly affects wage dispersion. Capital 
accumulation, in terms of both equipment (fixed capital) and educational attainment (human capital) also 
have a major impact on our dependent variables. 
 
                                                           
16 While the standard expectation is of a positive sign (because a higher tax wedge under wage bargaining leads to net 
wage resistance, and therefore increases labour costs and decreases employment), general equilibrium consideration 
may lead to the opposite expectation (see Corneo 1995).  
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3.4. The determinants of personal income inequality 
We move next to the determinants of personal income inequality. Table 5 reports our estimates of 
equations (21) and (22) for the largest available sample.17  The  1st column of table 5 abstracts from 
country and year fixed effects, which are subsequently included in the 2nd and 3rd columns; a linear time 
trend and dummies controlling for changes in definitions are also included.18 We find that all variables 
have significant coefficients with the expected signs, with the exception of the unemployment rate. The 
labour share has a negative coefficient, while the wage differential has a positive one.19 The 
unemployment benefit appears negatively related to income inequality, whereas the unemployment rate 
has an insignificant coefficient. However, the unemployment rate has a positive and significant sign when 
we move to instrumental variable estimation. The linear time trend bears a negative and significant 
coefficient, indicating an unexplained decline in inequality over the sample period.  
  The comparison between the OLS results obtained in the 3rd and 4th columns and the IV 
estimates reported in 5th and 6th columns indicates that OLS-estimation provides downward-biased 
estimates of the actual effect of the labour share and wage inequality on income inequality, and an upward 
bias for the effect of the unemployment benefit.20 This bias could be merely due to measurement errors, 
but it could also indicate that some unobservable variable, which correlates with both income inequality 
and labour market institutions – such as the political orientation of the government or the attitude of the 
population towards redistribution – has been omitted. It is interesting to note that, while the impact of 
passive labour market policies remains significant and negative, the unemployment rate and the time trend 
gain statistical significance under IV estimation. As a robustness check, columns 7 and 8 report the same 
model estimated in first differences, with and without country fixed effects: the coefficient on the labour 
share retains its sign and significance, even if the effect is attenuated, whereas the wage differential is close 
to non-significance, while the variables related to unemployment are both insignificant. 
 
                                                           
17 The sample size hinges crucially on the availability of data on wage differentials. If we concentrate on personal 
income inequality only, the available sample is made of 233 observations. When we consider the overlapping with 
information on wage differentials, the sample is further reduced to 142 observations. In order not to loose too many 
observations, we have replaced the missing observation for the P9010 variable with its country-specific sample mean. 
The sample reduction due to the availability of data on wage differentials  (2nd and 5th columns) does not affect sign 
and significance of the other regressor (details available from the authors). This fictitious enlargement of the sample 
allows us to retain relevant information that otherwise would be excluded due to missing observations on earnings 
differentials. Fort his reason, in the sequel we will consider this extended sample. 
18 The controls for definition include whether the income is gross or net, and whether the recipient is household 
equivalent or person equivalent. We also experimented with errors clustered by countries, without significant 
changes (available from the authors). 
19 Kenworthy (2003) uses household income inequality and personal earnings inequality (proxied by p90/p10 ratio) 
computed from LIS (Luxemburg Income Study), with one observation for 14 countries. By regressing the former 
onto the latter, he finds a coefficient comprised between 0.61 and 0.68, depending on various specifications, which is 
much lower than our figures. But sample size and countries are not comparable. 
20 The instrument have been selected from the regressors used in tables 2, 3 and 4 so as to satisfy the Sargan test for 
overidentifying restrictions.  
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Table 5 – Determinants of personal income inequality – full sample – OLS and IV estimates 
robust standard errors – t-statistics in parentheses - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6  7  8 





labour share at market price  0.229  -0.297 -0.365 -0.261 -0.365 -1.345  -0.141  -0.134





extended p90/p10 decile 
ratio   -1.219 4.212 5.145 0.973  17.942  26.848  0.745  0.697
 [2.51]**  [3.99]*** [3.71]*** [0.34]  [4.52]*** [4.14]***  [1.69]*  [1.58]
unemployment  rate  -0.697 0.021 0.033 -2.679 0.784 1.138 0.029  0.025
 [6.11]***  [0.28]  [0.31]  [2.61]*** [2.42]** [2.45]**  [0.56]  [0.48]
unemployment benefit -8.52  -21.6  -23.398 2.284  -17.328 -11.079  0.124  1.953
 [3.45]***  [5.47]*** [6.45]*** [0.26]  [3.98]*** [1.73]*  [0.03]  [0.42]
time  trend    0.038 0.091 0.636 -0.222  -0.423     
   [1.02]  [1.39]  [3.67]*** [2.46]** [2.62]***     
Constant yes  yes  yes  yes yes yes  yes  yes 
Country  fixed  effects    yes yes yes yes yes   yes 
Year fixed effects      yes      yes     
Observations  210 210 210 210 210 210  202  202 
R²  0.51 0.93 0.94 0.12 0.87 0.79  0.05  0.15 
Sargan test (p-value)        0.05  0.07  0.80     
 
Endogenous variables: labour share, unemployment rate, p90/p10. 
Instruments: (log)capital×worker, tax wedge, years of education, minimum wage, bargaining coordination. 
 
  
  Our preferred specification, in terms of sign, significance and size of the effects, is the 5th column 
of table 5. Evaluated at sample means, the estimated elasticity of personal income inequality with respect 
to the labour share is equal to –0.61, which implies that reducing the labour share by one standard 
deviation would raise the Gini coefficient by 2.47 points. The estimated elasticity with respect to the wage 
differential is greater, reaching the value 1.63: increasing the decile ratio by one standard deviation would 
raise the Gini coefficient by 1.27 Gini points. The elasticities with respect to the unemployment benefit 
and the unemployment rate are much lower, respectively 0.12 and 0.14.  
The results are basically unchanged when we computed quinquennial averages of the data, when 
we restrict the data to the subsample of countries for which we have longer time series, and  when we use 
the labour share measure adjusted for self-employment (details available from the authors). On the 
contrary, when we use the alternative series for income inequality, the labour share is less significant, with 
a coefficient that is half in size. The wage differential and the unemployment subsidy are still highly 
significant, with coefficients of similar sizes, while the unemployment rate is totally insignificant. 
 
Table 6. – Determinants of personal income inequality – 3SLS regressions  














labour share at market price   -0.723       
 [4.25]***       
p90/p10 decile ratio  7.389       
 [3.50]***       
unemployment rate  0.294       
 [2.05]**       
unemployment benefit -5.593  7.864  -0.426  5.771 
  [1.35] [2.20]** [1.47]  [1.34] 
union density rates    1.862  -2.005  23.406 
   [0.45]  [6.05]***  [4.59]*** 
ratio minimum/median wage    3.437  -3.505  41.527 
   [0.58]  [7.38]***  [6.50]*** 
log capital per worker    22.136  0.289  13.821 
   [5.71]***  [0.90]  [3.12]*** 
average years of education    -7.783  -0.104   
   [5.06]***  [0.83]   
log oil price in national currency   -2.567     
   [2.88]***    
tax  wedge      -36.702 
      [5.94]*** 
time  trend  0.136  0.058  -2.687 
  [0.10]  [0.53]  [1.67]* 
Constant yes  yes  yes  yes 
Country fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Year fixed effects  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Observations  135 135 135  135 
Root mean squared error  1.3  1.06  0.08  1.31 
R²  0.96 0.94 0.99  0.81 
Controls for changes in definition included.  
 
We now consider the alternative strategy of estimating the simultaneous equation system defined 
by equations (18), (19), (20) and (21) through three-stage least squares. The estimated coefficients are 
reported in table 6.21 Previous results are confirmed: our three endogenous variables (the labour share, 
wage differential and unemployment rate) are correlated with income inequality, whereas the 
unemployment benefit exerts its impact only indirectly, through the labour share. The equation for the 
determination of the labour share is consistent with what we have already found in least square estimation 
(table 2), including country and year fixed effects. Similarly, for the wage differential the pressure for wage 
compression deriving from union presence and/or from minimum wage legislation is consistent with the 
OLS estimates reported in table 3, even if capital accumulation and unemployment benefit loose 
                                                           
21 Note that sample size declines from 210 to 135 observations, because we cannot use the extended series for the 
wage differential.  
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significance. What is less satisfying is the unemployment equation, where the tax wedge continues to have 
a negative impact, while the capital-labour ratio has positive coefficient.22  
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The predictive ability of the model is good, as can be seen from figure 2 that compares the actual 
and the predicted dynamics of the Gini index. This is rather impressive if one considers the block 
recursive nature of the model, noting that in addition to its own prediction error, the prediction for the 
Gini index accumulates the prediction errors from the other three endogenous variables. In particular our 
model captures the trend reversal in income inequality observed in most European countries at the end of 
the 1970s (notably the Netherlands, France and United Kingdom), which seems to be largely explained by 
the contemporaneous decline in the labour share. 
 
3.5. Counterfactual exercises 
We have performed a number of counterfactual exercises to assess the relative importance of the various 
labour market variables. To illustrate the process, consider figure 3. Using the estimated coefficients in 
table 6, we have obtained the predicted values for labour share, wage differential and unemployment rate 
for all the country/year observations available in the sample (and even outside the estimation sample, as 
                                                           
22 The former sign reverts to positive when the sample is restricted to 6 countries for which we have more consistent 
observations (89 observations), while the latter becomes insignificant if year fixed effects are neglected.  
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witnessed by the predicted Japanese inequality index reported in figure 2). We then use these values to 
further predict the Gini coefficient.  
  In figure 3, in addition to the standard prediction (continuous line) we also report the Gini index 
replacing the predicted US labour share by the French labour share (long-dashed line) and the US wage 
differential by the French wage differential (short-dashed line). The figure illustrates that inequality in the 
US would have been 10 Gini points lower if US earnings differentials had been comparable to French 
ones. However, the higher labour share experienced by US economy helped reduce income inequality, 
which would have been even higher had the labour share declined as in continental Europe. 
The reverse situation occurs when we make use of US labour share and wage differentials in 
European countries, as we do in figure 4 for the UK and Norway. Not surprisingly, both countries would 
have experienced greater inequality had they had the US wage differential. The effect of the labour share, 
however, differs. The UK is characterised by a relatively high and stable labour share and therefore the 
replacement of US labour share does not affect income inequality, while for Norway its relatively low 
labour share was an unequalising force over the period. 
In figures 6, 7 and 8 we performed counterfactual simulations by replacing the dynamics of the 
main exogenous variables, labour market institutions (union density and unemployment benefit) and 
capital accumulation (capital per worker and educational attainment) with those for the US. In figure 5 we 
use the US union density and unemployment benefit in the prediction of income inequality for Sweden 
and France, while in figure 6 we do the same for Canada and UK. In general, income inequality would 
have been higher if European countries had experienced US-type labour market institutions, but there are 
country specific variations. In the case of Sweden, a country characterised by high density rates (due to the 
so called “Ghent system”, where unions run unemployment benefit schemes on behalf of the state), a 
decline of density rates to the US level would have induced a 6 Gini points increase in inequality, while a 
similar move would have left unaffected France, where union coverage is high but membership is even 
lower than US.23 The impact of unemployment benefit changes is more limited, because the US-Europe 
gap is lower.24 All European countries considered in this exercise would have experienced an increase in 
income inequality, and the impact seems stronger in Canada, which is typically considered a US-type 
economy but stronger worker protection. 
                                                           
23 For a comparison of different models of unionisation see Checchi and Lucifora 2002. 
24 Looking at table 1, the sample-average replacement rate in US is 0.12, to be compared with 0.19 of Sweden, 0.22 
of UK, 0.26 of Canada and 0.30 of France.   
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We also consider the role of physical and human capital. As can be seen in figure 7, these 
variables have very significant impact on income inequality. Looking at the left panel, where Italian 
inequality has been recalculated using US values for capital per worker and average years of education in 
the population, we notice that inequality would have been much higher if we were to consider the highly 
educated US labour force instead of the low educated Italian population. According to the estimated 
model in table 6, educational attainment has two countervailing effects: on the one hand, the increased 
supply of human capital reduces the wage differential; on the other, by making skilled labour cheaper, it 
also induces substitution between skilled and unskilled, thus depressing the labour share. The overall 
effect is therefore ambiguous, and can only by judged case by case. In the case of Germany, a country 
with similar educational attainment to the US, it is physical capital that generates distributional differences. 
The high German capital-labour ratio had a strong equalising effect, through its impact on both wage 
inequality and the labour share.  
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In order to provide some information about the order of magnitude of these impacts, table 7 
reports estimates of the reduced form equation for income inequality corresponding to equation (23). The 
table reports the OLS standardised beta coefficients, which are to be read as the change, in terms of a 
fraction of a standard deviation in the dependent variable, induced by a standard deviation change in the  
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exogenous variable. The first two columns consider the entire sample, controlling for country and year 
effects, while the 3rd and 4th column restrict the sample to 6 countries for which we have longer series of 
income inequality (US, UK, Germany, Sweden Italy and Canada). The two types of capital have the 
strongest correlations with income inequality, with the overall impact being negative for capital equipment 
and positive for human capital.25 Two labour market institutions, union density and unemployment 
benefit, negatively affect income inequality and have effects of comparable magnitude, while the minimum 
wage has a marginally significant, but still negative, effect. Finally, the tax wedge, which probably works as 
a proxy of the welfare state size, also exhibits a strong and negative correlation with income inequality. 
 
Table 7 – Determinants of personal income inequality – reduced form – OLS  
Robust normalized beta coefficients - * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
  1 2 3 4 




union density rates  -0.328***  -0.423***  -0.053  0.187 
ratio minimum/median wage  -0.055  -0.315*  0.405  0.313 
unemployment benefit  -0.216**  -0.342*** -0.191* -0.302*** 
tax  wedge  -0.341*** -0.371*** -0.422*** -0.527*** 
log capital per worker  -0.422**  -0.965***  -0.831***  -1.918*** 
average years of education  -0.076  1.393***  -0.061  2.200*** 
Constant  yes yes yes yes 
Time  trend  yes yes yes yes 
Country  fixed  effects  yes yes yes yes 
Year fixed effects    yes    yes 
Observations  211 211 154 154 
R²  0.95 0.96 0.93 0.95 
Controls for changes in definitions and oil price included. 
 
 
4. Conclusions  
The recent literature on the determinants of personal income inequality has highlighted the role  of a 
number of factors, including output levels, globalisation, educational attainment, and political stability.  
Many of these variables help us understand distributional differences in a large cross-section of countries, 
but have little explanatory power when trying to understand differences across the rather similar OECD 
economies or variations over time. In this paper we have argued that labour market institutions have 
played an essential role in explaining differences in inequality  within the OECD. 
  Our analysis highlights the different channels through which labour market institutions affect 
distribution. In particular, these institutions affect simultaneously relative wages, the labour share, and the 
unemployment rate, all of which then have an impact on the distribution of personal incomes. Because 
                                                           
25 Barro (2000) finds a negative correlation between inequality and secondary school enrolment and a positive 
correlation with tertiary enrolment; these findings are difficult to compare with ours, since we have a stock measure, 
combining three levels of educational attainment.  
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they operate through these three mechanisms, their impact is a prioir ambiguous. Our results indicate that 
the factor distribution of income is still an essential component of personal income inequality, and that 
the impact of labour market institutions operates in part through the way in which income is shared 
between capital and labour. The overall effect of stronger institutions is to reduce income inequality, with 
part of this effect occurring through wage compression and part of it through a reduction in the rewards 
to capital. 
  Our analysis has important policy implications. The first one concerns the role of redistribution. 
The view that a widening wage dispersion has been the major cause of the recent increase in income 
inequality leaves little role for policy. The increase in wage dispersion is usually seen as the result of trade 
and innovation. Since both increased openness and technological change are seen as desirable, greater 
inequality has been perceived as an unavoidable by-product of the growth process. Income redistribution 
can then be used to reduce net-income inequalities, but would not affect the distribution of market 
incomes. In contrast, the negative impact of the labour share on the Gini coefficient indicates that the 
distribution of wealth across agents is still a major source of inequality, and hence leaves room for policy 
to affect inequality in the long-run. Income redistribution will have the effect of reducing differences in 
the accumulation of wealth across agents and hence affect gross-income inequalities in the future.  
The second aspect concerns the role of labour market institutions as a source of equalisation. We 
have found that labour market institutions significantly affect income inequality through several channels: 
stronger unions obtain a larger wage share and compress wage differentials, while higher minimum wages 
reduce wage differentials. Despite the associated increase in the unemployment, the overall impact is to 
reduce inequality. A caveat is, however, in order. Our analysis is static and takes the stock of physical 
capital as given. This implies that we are ignoring the potential impact of labour market institutions on 
investment. Given the strong equalising effect that a higher capital-labour ratio has, this is an important 





Acemoglu, Daron (2003). “Labour- and Capital-Augmenting Technical Change,” Journal of the European 
Economic Association, 1(1), pp. 1–37. 
Aghion, P., Caroli, E. and García-Peñalosa, C. 1999. “Inequality and Economic Growth: The Perspective 
from the New Growth Theories”, Journal of Economic Literature, 37(4): 1615-60. 
Alderson, A. and  F.Nielsen. 2002. Globalisation and the great U-turn: income inequality trends in 16 
OECD countries. American Journal of Sociology 107: 1244-1299. 
Anand, S and Kanbur, S.M.R. 1993. “Inequality and Development: A Critique”, Journal of Development 
Economics 41(1): 19-43. 
Antras, Pol (2004). “Is the U.S. Aggregate Production Function Cobb–Douglas? New Estimates of the 
Elasticity of Substitution,” Contributions to Macroeconomics, 4 (1). 
Atkinson, A. and A.Brandolini. 2003. The Panel-of-Countries approach to explaining income inequality: 
an interdisciplinary agenda. mimeo 
Atkinson, A.B. 1997. “Bringing the Income Distribution in from the Cold”, Economic Journal, 107(441): 
297-321. 
Atkinson, A.B. and A. Brandolini. 2001. “Promise and Pitfalls in the Use of “Secondary” Data-Sets: 
Income Inequality in OECD Countries as a Case Study”, Journal of Economic Literature, 39(3): 771-
99. 
Atkinson, Anthony. 1970. “On the Measurement of Inequality,” Journal of Economic Theory 2, pp. 244-263. 
Atkinson, Anthony. 1975. The Economics of Inequality. Second edition (1983). Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Barro, R.J. 2000. “Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries”, Journal of  Economic Growth, 5: 5-32. 
Barro, R.J. and Lee, J.-W. 1993. “International Comparisons of Educational Attainment”, Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 32 (3): 363-94. 
Bentolila S. and G. Saint-Paul, 2003. “Explaining Movements in the Labor Share”, Contributions to 
Macroeconomics 3(1), article 9.  
http://www.bepress.com/bejm/contributions/vol3/iss1/art9 
Blanchard, O. 1997. The Medium Run. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2: 89–158. 
Bourguignon, F. and Morrisson, C. 1990. “Income distribution, development and foreign trade: a cross-
section analysis”, European Economic Review, 34 (): 1113-32. 
Bourguignon, F. and Morrisson, C. 1998. “Inequality and development and: the role of dualism”, Journal of 
Development Economics, 57 (): 233-57. 
Bourguignon, F., F.H.G. Ferreira and P.G. Leite, 2002. “  Beyond Oaxaca-Blinder  : Accounting for 
Differences in Household Income Distributions Across Countries”, document de travail DELTA 
working paper 2002-04.  
Brandolini, A. 2003. A bird-eye view of long-run changes in income inequality. Bank of Italy, mimeo. 
Breen, R. and García-Peñalosa, C. “Income Inequality and Macroeconomic Volatility: An Empirical 
Investigation”, forthcoming Review of Development Economics.   
Card, D., T.Lemieux and W.Craig Riddel. 2003. Unionization and wage inequality: a comparative study of 
the U.S., the U.K., and Canada. NBER working paper n.9473 
Champernowne, D.G. 1973. The Distribution of Income between Persons. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Checchi, D. 2004. “Does educational achievement help to explain income inequality ?” chapter 4 in A. 
Cornia (ed), Inequality, Growth and Poverty in an Era of Liberalization and Globalization. Oxford 
University Press 2004 
Checchi, D. and C.Lucifora. 2002. Unions and labour market institutions in Europe. Economic Policy 17(2): 
362-401 
Cohen, D. and M. Soto. 2001. Growth and human capital: good data, good results. OECD Development 
Centre Technical paper n.179 
Corneo, G. 1995. National wage bargaining in an internationally integrated product market, European 
Journal of Political Economy 11 (1995), 107-116 
Daudey, E. 2004. “The Sharing of Value-Added: Data Sources”, mimeo, GREQAM. 
De Serres, A., S.Scarpetta and C.De la Maisonneuve. 2002. Sectoral shifts in Europe and the United 
States: how they affect aggregate labour shares and the properties of wage equations. OECD 
Economic Department wp.326. 
Deininger, K. and Squire, L.  1996. “Measuring income inequality: a new data base”, The World Bank 
Economic Review 10 (3): 565-591.  
 
30
DiNardo, John, Nicole M. Fortin and Thomas Lemieux. 1996. Labor Market Institutions and the 
Distribution of Wages, 1973-1992: A Semi-Parametric Approach. Econometrica 64 (5): 1001-1044. 
Esping-Andersen, G. 2004. Income distribution and life chance opportunities. to appear in A.Giddens 
(ed). The new egalitarianism: opportunity and prosperity in modern society. 
Förster, M. 2000. Trends and driving factors in income distribution and poverty in the OECD area. 
Labour Market And Social Policy- Occasional Papers No. 42 
Gastil, R. Freedom in the World, Westport: Greenwood.  
Gollin D., 2002. “Getting Income Shares Right”. Journal of Political Economy, vol. 110, no. 2 
Gottschalk, P. and Smeeding, T.M. 1997. “Cross-National Comparisons of Earnings and Income 
Inequality”, Journal of Economic Literature, 35: 633-687.Hamermesh, David S. (1993). Labor Demand. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Katz L.F. and Murphy, K.M., 1992. “Changes in Relative Wages, 1963-1987: Supply and Demand 
Factors”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 107(1), pp. 35-78 
Kenworthy, L. 2003. Explaining comparative trends in income inequality in the 1980s and 1990s. mimeo 
(appeared as chapter 3 in Egalitarian Capitalism. Russel Sage Foundation 2004) 
Koeninger, W., M.Leonardi and L.Nunziata. 2005. Labour market institutions and wage inequality. mimeo  
Krusell, Per, Ohanian, Lee, Rios-Rull, Victor, and Violante, Giovanni (2000). “Capital Skill 
Complementary and Inequality.” LXIIX, Econometrica, pp. 1029–1053. 
Li, H., Squire, L. and Zou, H.-F. 1998. “Explaining International and Intertemporal Variations in Income 
Inequality”, Economic Journal 108: 26-43.  
Nickell, S. 1997, “Employment and labor market rigidities: Europe versus North America”, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 11/3: 55-74. 
Nickell, S. and L.Nunziata. 2001. Labour market institutions database 
Nickell, S., L.Nunziata and W.Ochel. 2005. Unemployment in the OECD since the 1960s. What do we 
know? Economic Journal 115: 1-27. 
OECD 2002. Benefits and wages – OECD indicators. Paris 
Ricardo, David. 1821. Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. 3 rd ed, in The Works and Correspondence of 
David Ricardo, ed. Piero Sraffa, Vol 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Rowthorn, R. 1999. Unemployment, wage-bargaining and capital-labour substitution. Cambridge Journal of 
Economics 23, 413-425. 
Sen, Amartya. 1973. On Economic Inequality. Oxford: Oxford University Press, edition 1997. 
Stiglitz, J.E. 1969. “The Distribution of Income and Wealth among Individuals”, Econometrica 37: 382-397. 
Summers,R. and Heston, A. 1991. “The Penn World Table(Mark 5):An expanded set of international 
comparisons,1950–1988,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 106(2): 327–368. 
Tinbergen, J. 1975. Income Distribution. Amsterdam: North Holland.   
 
31
Appendix I:  Wage and Employment Determination 
 
The Bargaining Model 
The bargaining problem is given by  
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     ( A . 1 )    
The union takes into account the fact that, given the skilled wage  s w , the reduction in L due to an 
increase in  u w  will reduce skilled employment and hence the marginal product of skilled labour. The 
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Comparative Statics 
Consider first a number of comparative statics obtained from the production function. From equation 
(1b), we obtain the elasticities of demand for the two types of labour 
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Using (11), we can shown  
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Write the equilibrium of the bargaining problem (A.3) as  ) , , ( ) , , ( ) 1 ( b L g f L θ γ ε θ τ ρ
ρ = − , where 














) , , (        ( A . 1 0 )  
ρ































































































































































        ( A . 1 4 )  
The impact of parameter changes may depend on the elasticity of substitution in production. Hence we 
need to consider three possible cases. 
 
Case 1:  0 > σ  
Using (A.6)-(A.9) and the fact that  0 > σ  implies  0 / > ∂ θ ∂ x , we can establish:  0 < ∆ ,  0 1 < ∆ , 

































     
From (A.6)-(A.9) we can now establish the effects of an increase in union bargaining power: 


















An increase in the capital stock raises both skilled and unskilled employment,  0 / > dK dL , 
0 /   > dK dH . However, the impact of K  on ω and θ is ambiguous, as the increases in H , L and K  
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If the elasticity of unskilled labour with respect to capital is less than one, then these two expressions are 
positive, implying  0 / < ω dK d  and  0 / > θ dK d . 
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Case 2:  0 = σ  




,    0 >
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,    0 <
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dL
.         
It is straightforward to show that the effects on ω are as in case 1, while there is no impact on θ.  
 
Case 3:  0 < σ  
In this case  0 / < ∂ θ ∂ x , hence  0 > ∆ ,  0 3 < ∆ , and  1 ∆  and   2 ∆  can be positive or negative. From the 
expressions in (A.12) to (A.14), it is clear that the comparative statics cannot be signed.  
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Appendix II: Data sources 
Data on income inequality are obtained from two alternative sources: the variable GINI1 is obtained from 
Brandolini 2003, whereas the variable GINI2 is derived Deininger and Squire 1996 (downloaded on 
22/10/1998), by selecting “high quality data” only. In both cases we have controlled for the type of 
income (“gross”, “disposable” or “net”) and the type of recipient (“household”, “household equivalent” 
or “person equivalent”). As it can be seen by the figure Erreur ! Source du renvoi introuvable. below, 
the two indices provide very similar information for Italy, United Kingdom and United States, whereas 
diverging for others countries (especially for Nordic countries). 
 
Data on labour shares are obtained from the OECD-Stan dataset, reconstructed backward to the 60’s 
from the Research Group at the Bank of France, and made available to us by Emilie Daudey (see Daudey, 
2004). They are defined as the ratio between “compensation per employees” and “gross domestic product 
(income approach)”, at current prices, for the entire economy. The data can be corrected in order to 
include the self-employed (see Gollin, 2002). The most common adjusted measure of the labour share is 
obtained by assigning to the self-employed the average earnings of employees.  Since we do not find this 
assumption very convincing, we stick to the simple labour share. Results with corrected labour share are 
available upon request. 
 
Data on unemployment rates are from Nickell and Nunziata 2001, whereas the replacement rate of the 
unemployment subsidy is obtained on a biannual base by OECD 2002 (and then replicated for the 
missing years). The wage differential is computed as the ratio between the 9th and 1st earnings decile, on 
data on earnings distribution from OECD (Trends in earning dispersion database). The Kaitz index 
(minimum to median wage) is obtained from OECD (Minimum wage database). For countries were 
minimum wages are non-existent (for example for they are replaced by national contract, this variable has 
been set equal to unity (Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden and UK for most of the 
sample period). Data on union density (ratio between union membership and active dependent 
employment) are from .  
 
The capital stock is derived from the Penn World Tables, Mark 5.6 (see Summer and Heston 1991). Since 
data on labour force composition by skills are not available over a long time span, we relied on two 
potential proxies derived from educational attainment, i.e. measures of human capital. In the text we have 
used the average years of education in the adult population, obtainable from Cohen and Soto 2001.26 The 
oil price in national currency is computed from IMF Financial Statistics. Finally, the tax wedge measure is 




                                                           
26 The alternative measure is given by the population share with “at least some secondary schooling”. Since these 
two measures are collinear (correlation coefficient is 0.84), we have chosen the one with the stronger statistical 
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